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ABSTRACT
Satellite communication networks have been widely used to provide essential communication
services, includingvoice communication, global positioning,message communication, etc. How-
ever, sorts of network attacks are easy to be launched in these networks due to the limited com-
putation capability and communication width, long communication delay, and intermittent link
connection. In this paper, we first propose a new [E]ncryption-based [M]utual [A]uthentication
and [K]ey [U]pdate (EMAKU) protocol in satellite communication networks. Next we analyze the
security of the EMAKU protocol under two classic network attacks which are replay attack and
man-in-the-middle attack. Finally, experiments show that the EMAKU protocol is 21.5% faster
than the traditional encryption-based authentication protocols, and the average time of key
update of the EMAKU protocol is about 450.01ms.
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With the increasing development of communica-
tion technology, satellite communication systems are
becoming more and more prevalent [1–7]. They can
provide a variety of essential communication services,
including voice communication, global positioning,
and message communication [8–11]. These systems
usually have to face serious network attacks, such as
replay attack or man-in-the-middle attack, because the
computation capability and communication width are
limited [12], the communication delay is long [13], and
the link connection is intermittent [14]. Therefore, a
secure satellite communication network is difficult to
be built for satellite communication systems.
The essential method to guarantee the security of
satellite communication networks is to authenticate
each new satellitewhen it launches into the network and
exchange a key among the satellites and the on-ground
base stations. Several authentication and key agree-
ment schemes have been proposed to provide secu-
rity assurance in satellite communication networks.
For instances, Wullems et al. [15] proposed a pub-
lic key cryptosystem-based authentication protocol to
improve the security of satellite systems. However, the
protocol was unidirectional, so it cannot meet the
requirement of mutual authentication. Cruickshank
et al. [16] designed a mutual authentication protocol
between endpoints and satellites. But the designed pro-
tocol had a high maintenance cost and a high failure
risk. Sasaki et al. [17] put forward a double-layered
inclined orbit constellation to improve the robustness
of satellite communication network. But they did not
consider the security for the network. Zhang et al. [18]
proposed a low-earth orbit satellite and group key
agreement protocol based 3GPP authentication and
key agreement protocol. But they did not consider key
update cases. Zhu et al. [19] proposed an entity authen-
tication and access control scheme in satellite commu-
nication networks, but the protocol is not suitable for
authentication among satellites.
The main contributions of this paper are summa-
rized as follows:
• This paper first proposes a new [E]ncryption-based
[M]utual [A]uthentication and [K]ey [U]pdate
(EMAKU) protocol for double-layered satellite com-
munication networks. The protocol considers the
limited computation and communication resources
of satellites. Meanwhile, it applies geostationary-
earth-orbit (GEO) satellites to control the clusters
of low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellites, such that the key
update process of LEO satellites can always be con-
trolled by the on-ground base stations.
• We take the replay attack and man-in-the-middle
attack as examples to demonstrate the security of the
EMAKU protocol.
• A simulation platform is implemented, and simu-
lation experiments show that the efficiency of the
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proposed protocol is 21.5% faster than the tradi-
tional encryption-based authentication protocols,
while the average time of key update is about
450.01ms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we mainly discuss the related works of
authentication protocols and architectures in satellite
communication networks. In Section 3, we describe the
preliminaries. In Section 4, we discuss the models and
goals of this paper. In Section 5, we describe the mutual
authentication and key update protocol. In Section 6,
we analyse the security and performance of the pro-
posed protocol. In the last section, we summarize the
paper.
2. Related works
There are various of authentication and key exchange
protocols designed for authenticating entities in wire-
less communication networks. For instance, Lu et al.
[20] proposed an authentication and key agreement
protocol based on 3GPP authentication and key agree-
ment protocol. But it is not suitable to use in satellite
networks due to its huge resources requirement. Zeng
et al. [21] also proposed an efficient anonymous user
authentication protocol for mobile Internet of things.
However, it took too much computation cost if it was
directly used in satellite communication networks. Lin
et al. [22] proposed an efficient dynamic authentica-
tion protocol. It reduced space storage and key man-
agement complexity without using verification table.
But the computation cost of the protocol is too heavy
to be deployed in satellites with limited computation
resources.
There are also several authentication protocols
designed for authenticating entities in satellite commu-
nication networks. For example, Chang et al. [23] pro-
posed an authentication and key agreement protocol
in the satellite communication networks. This protocol
aimed to authenticate between endpoints and satellites.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to be practical for mutual
authentication among satellites. Lee et al. [24] presented
an entity authentication protocol which made use of
static and dynamic identities in a verification table to
lower computation cost. However, the proposed proto-
col was not secure when the verification table is leaked.
Zhibo et al. [25] put forward an end-to-end authen-
tication protocol in the satellite communication net-
works. This protocol was proposed on the Internet key
exchange (IKE) protocol. However, the computation
cost of the proposed protocol was heavier than that of
the authentication protocols based on private key cryp-
tography, since the fundamental IKE protocol applied
public key cryptography.
In summary, the existing works cannot meet all
the requirements of security, efficiency, and limited
computation and storage cost for mutual authentica-
tion and key update for satellites communication and
satellite-endpoint communication, simultaneously.
3. Preliminaries
In this paper, we modify a reliable maintenance proto-
col proposed in [26] to update secret encryption and
integrity keys between Ground Control Center (GCC)
and satellites. Here the specification of the reliable
maintenance protocol is shown in Figure 1, where the
Enc is an encryption algorithm that can resist against
chosen plain text attack, andMAC is a message authen-
tication code algorithm that is secure under chosen
message attack.
The reliable maintenance protocol mainly contained
two steps. In the first step, mutual authentication
between GCC and a satellite that neighbours to the tar-
geted satellite required to update an encryption key CK
and an integrity key IK. In the second step, the GCC
passes new keys to the targeted satellite via two secure
communication channels which are (1) between GCC
and the neighbouring satellite, and (2) between the
neighbouring satellite and the targeted satellite.Our key
update protocol is based on the reliable maintenance
protocol.
4. Models and goals
4.1. Systemmodel
Figure 2 depicts the system model of satellite commu-
nication networks. It consists of User Terminals(UT),
GCC, GEO satellites and LEO satellites. Since LEO
satellite networks cannot keep connectionwithGCC all
the time, and parts of GEO satellites are out of the com-
munication range with GCC, it is of great importance
to build a secure satellites–satellites communication
channel by which GCC can communicate with every
GEO and LEO satellite. Here, each pair of neighbouring
GEO/LEO satellites is assumed to have a communica-
tion channel. Specifically, each GEO satellite can com-
municate with LEO satellites when the LEO satellites
run into the communication range.
• GEO satellites. A GEO satelliteGV is regarded as a 3-
tuple < nGV , sGV , cGV >, where nGV is the number
of GEO satellites, sGV stands for the security param-
eter, and cGV represents the control information for
GEO satellites.
• LEO satellites. LV represents a LEO satellite, which
can be denoted by a 3-tuple < nLV , sLV , cLV >. Here
nLV is the number of LEO satellites, sLV stands for the
security parameter, and cLV represents the control
information for LEO satellites.
• GCC. GCC mainly contain an identity management
module, a control module and a security module.
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Figure 1. Reliable maintenance.
Figure 2. Systemmodel of satellite communication networks.
GCC can assign pre-shared keys, authenticate and
manage GEO/LEO satellites.
• GEO satellite networks. GSN denotes the GEO satel-
lite networks, which consist of GEO-GEO satellite
communication channels. The GEO satellite net-
works can be regarded as an attribute graph GSN =
(GV ,GE), where GV denotes a GEO satellite as a
vertex in graph, and GE denotes a GEO-GEO satel-
lite communication channel as an edge in the graph.
• LEO satellite networks. LSN denotes the LEO satel-
lite networks, which contain LEO-LEO satellites
communication channels. The LEO satellite can
be regarded as an attribute graph LSN = (LV , LE),
whereLV denotes a LEO satellite as a vertex in graph,
and LE denotes an LEO-LEO satellite communica-
tion channel as an edge in the graph.
• Communication. Send denotes message that is deliv-
ered from an entity to other one.
• Authentication. Auth denotes the authentication
protocol between two entities in satellite communi-
cation networks. That is, an authentication protocol
between two GV-GV, or two LV-LV, or GV-LV, or
GCC-GV.
In this paper, the proposed protocol can be divided
into two parts: mutual authentication and key update.
The mutual authentication is among satellites, and
between satellite andGCC.The key update is accomplished
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by three components of the GCC, GEO satellite and
LEO satellite. The procedure is start with the GCC.
More concretely, the GCC Send messages to the GEO
satellite, and then the GEO satellite Send messages to
the LEO satellite.
4.2. Threatmodel
The threat is presumed to have the ability of launch-
ing active attacks such as replay attack or man-in-the-
middle attack, etc. Specifically, since the communica-
tion channels of the satellite communication networks
are wireless, all the messages received can be regarded
as generating or forwarding by adversaries theoretically.
In other words,messages occur on any satellite commu-
nication channels can be assumed to be intercepted or
replaced by adversary.
4.3. Goal and challenge
Our goal is to build three secure satellite communica-
tion channels (1) between UT and GCC, (2) between
two GEO/LEO satellites, and (3) update CK and IK
between GCC and a GEO/LEO satellite, in the satellite
communication networks defined in the system model
under various attacks defined in the threat model.
There are three challenges to attain our goal in satel-
lite communication networks. First, the computational
and bandwidth resources of satellite communication
networks are limited. Second, each satellite communi-
cation channel is public and vulnerable to be attacked.
Third, the topology of LSN is not stable from the view-
point of GCC.
5. An encryption-basedmutual authentication
and key update protocol in satellite
communication networks
In this section, we first propose two mutual authentica-
tion sub-protocols to establish secure communication
channels (1) among satellites and (2) between satellite
and GCC. Next, we propose a key update sub-protocol
for updating the CK and IK for LEO satellites.
5.1. Mutual authentication between a GEO/LEO
satellite and the GCC
GEO/LEO satellites utilize the symmetric keys, which
are used for authenticating Auth. Specifically, the for-
mer satellite executes the symmetry KGi for itself,
and the symmetric key KGij utilized for authentication
between satellites is presented by the GCC. The sym-
metric key is sent by the original satellite first, when
the satellite in orbit received the key, it executes the
authentication process through the keyKGij . The proto-
col specification is shown in Figure 3, and the process is
depicted in algorithm1.Adetailed description is shown
as follows.
Algorithm 1 Satellite and GCC networking authentica-
tion
Require: IDGi , IDG
Ensure: authentication result
1: AuthMessage ← MSG
2: Send AuthMessage to IDGi
3: IDGi Compute rG
4: AuthMessage ← MSG
5: Send AuthMessage to IDG
6: IDG Compute rG and XMAC
7: if MAC == XMAC then
8: AuthMessage ← MSG




13: IDGi Compute XMAC





(1) Firstly, IDG generates authentication message
which contain MSG. Then Send the message to
IDGi , ID is the identity of entity of the satellite
communication network.
(2) When IDGi receives the message, IDGi computes
rA, and then saves the value of rG. Next, IDGi gener-
ates its own authenticationmessagewhich contains
MSG1||MSG2, and sends the message to IDG.
(3) Once IDG receives the response, IDG computes rGi.
And then it checks whether XIDG is correct. If the
message content is correct, then generates the sec-
ond message which contains MSG. At the same
time, IDG generates sk||CK||IK. If the message is
not correct, the protocol aborts.
(4) Once IDGi receives the response, IDGi computes
XMAC, and the protocol will continue to check
XMAC. If its content is correct, IDGi generates
a message sk||CK||IK that is used in the future
communication.
5.2. Mutual authentication between twoGEO/LEO
satellites
All the satellites are assumed to be launched one by one
and gradually build a satellite communication network.
Thus, the authentication of different satellites is not
exact the same. When the first satellite is launched, the
network has not been built yet. The authentication for
the first satellite is authenticated through the proposed
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Figure 3. Authentication protocol between a GEO/LEO Satellite and the GCC.
mutual authentication protocol between a GEO/LEO
Satellite and the GCC. Upon completing the authen-
tication of the first satellite, the second satellite can be
deployed in a similar way.
Besides mutual authentication between a GEO/LEO
Satellite and the GCC, it is also vital to build a secure
communication channel for neighbouring satellites,
since there must exists GEO/LEO satellites that cannot
directly communicate with the GCC. So these satellites
can only authenticate with the GCC, when there are
secure communication channel among neighbouring
satellites. The steps of the mutual authentication pro-
tocol between two GEO/LEO satellites (called A and B
for short) are defined as below:
(1) A first calculates the authentication massageMSG
based on its own key KAB to initiate a challenge,
where the authentication message is made up of
the following three elements which are the identity
IDA, the encrypted ciphertext of random number
rA and theMAC of randomnumber rA. The gener-
ation process of themessageMSG is constructed as
MSG = EncKAB(rA). A then sends themessageMSG
to B.
(2) Once B receiving the MSG from A, it obtains rA
by decrypting EncKAB(rA) with KAB. B then gener-
ates a random number rB, and a messageMSG1 =
EncKAB(rB), MSG2 = MACKAB(rB||rA||IDA), MSG
= MSG1||MSG2. After that, the message MSG is
sent to A.
(3) Upon A receives B’s MSG, MSG1||MSG2 is com-
puted by MSG. A obtains rB by decrypting MSG1
and computes XMAC = MACKAB(rB||rA||IDA).
ThenAwill checkXMAC.While it is correct, A cal-
culates MSG = MACKAB(rA||rB) and sends MSG
to B. A computes sk = H(rA||rB), CK = Encsk(0),
IK = Encsk(1) for future communication.
(4) When B receives A’s MSG, B computes XAMC =
MACKAB(rA||rB). And then checks XAMC. If all of
the parameters above are correct, B computes sk =
H(rA||rB), CK = Encsk(0), IK = Encsk(1).
5.3. Key update for LEO satellites
The key update is designed for LEO satellites. In
the GEO/LEO satellite communication networks, GEO
satellites can be used to control some LEO satellites
AUTOMATIKA 339
when those satellites are compromised by an adver-
sary. The key update protocol contains two steps. First,
mutual authentication between GEO and LEO satel-
lites. Second, using the GEO satellites to update the key
of the compromised LEO satellites.
After establishing GSN and LSN, the key update for
LEO satellites can be implemented with the help of
GSN. Specifically, if the GCC wants to update key for a
LEO satellite which is out of the communication range,
it can use some GEO satellites as bridge. The protocol
specification is shown in Figure 4.
The following example illustrates the failure of a
high-orbiting satellite to describe the process to update
keys and re-build a secure communication channel is
shown in Figure 5 and the next two procedures.
Algorithm 2 Key Update Procedure 1
Require: KAB
Ensure: update state
1: Satellite and Ground Authenticate
2: get CK1, IK1,CK2, IK2
3: encrypt KAB
4: Send KAB to A and B
5: Send IDA to B and IDB to A




Algorithm 3 Key Update Procedure 2
Require: IDA, IDB
Ensure:
1: CK = f 2KAB(RAND1) IK = f 3KAB(RAND1)
2: MSG1 = EncCKAB(SQN||IDA) MSG2 =
MACIKAB(SQN||IDA)
3: AV = MSG1||MSG2||RAND1
4: Send AV to B
5: CK = f 2KAB(RAND1) IK = f 3KAB(RAND1)
6: check SQN and ID
7: MSG1 = EncCKAB(SQN + 1||IDA) MSG2 =
MACIKAB(SQN + 1||IDA)
8: AV = MSG1||MSG2
9: get SQN, ID
10: check SQN and ID




(1) Satellite A is first authenticated with GCC and
builds a secure communication channel by the
encryption key CK1, and the integrity key IK1,
while Satellite B is also authenticated with GCC
and builds a secure communication channel by the
encryption key CK2, and the integrity key IK2.
(2) The GCC allocates the symmetric key KAB for
satellites A and B on both secure communication
channels, and sends IDA to satellites B, and IDB to
satellites A.
(3) Satellite A calculates CKAB and IKAB, encrypts the
MAC values of SQN, IDA, and SQN and IDA, and
generates the AV and sends it to Satellite B.
(4) When satellite B receives satellite A’smessageAV, B
calculatesCKAB and IKAB to decrypt SQN and IDA,
and checks whether it is equal to the previously
received SQN value is within reasonable limits, if
there is a verification that fails to decline authenti-
cation. If both are verified successfully, it encrypts
SQN + 1 and IDB, calculates the MAC values of
SQN + 1 and IDB to form theAV vector, and sends
it to satellite A.
(5) When satellite A receives the message AV, it veri-
fies SQN and IDB, and checks if it is valid. If so, the
satellite authentication is successfully completed.
Otherwise, the authentication fails and access is
denied.
The completion of the above steps will enable the
satellites A and B to update their keys.
6. Security analysis and performance analysis
6.1. Security analysis
The Encryption-based Mutual Authentication and Key
Update (EMAKU) protocol can accomplish mutual
authentication and key update. Specifically, the EMA
KU protocol is used a symmetric key encryption
scheme to ensure the confidentiality of the protocol.
Message authentication code is used to ensure the
integrity of the protocol. Thus, attacks such as counter-
feiting and forgery can be resisted. We use the random
number instead of timestamps to protect against replay
attacks. In the process of satellite communication, key
update is run in the secure communication channel,
which can effectively resist against man-in-the-middle
attacks.
Moreover, the two entities in the communication
channel performmutual authentication and key update
to obtain the encryption key and the integrity key,
respectively. GCC will update both keys between the
compromised neighbouring LEO satellites. Specifically,
the EMAKU protocol uses a symmetric key generation
function to derive an encryption key and an integrity
key for providing the confidentiality and integrity.
Through the proposed protocol above, the traditional
attacks such as counterfeiting and forgery in the satel-
lite communication networks can be resisted. Also,
the EMAKU protocol uses the SQN to defend against
replay attacks.
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Figure 4. Control the invalid LEO satellite.
Figure 5. Key update protocol.
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Figure 6. Simulation in STK.
6.2. Performance analysis
We simulate the EMAKU protocol under a com-
puter which have an Intel (R) Core i7-7700HQ
CPU@2.80GHz processor to test its performance. We
uses openssl open source library security algorithm
in the simulation. In the experiments, we use virtual
machines to simulate satellites and use Satellite Tool Kit
9.0(STK for short) [27] to calculate satellite network
delay. The simulation in STK is shown in Figure 6.
In order to test the performance of the EMAKU
protocol, we carried out three experiments. The first
experiment is to compare the performance of our pro-
tocol with that of the traditional mutual authentication
protocol. In the first experiment, we put the protocols
into the satellite simulation environment to measure
the communication delay and computation delay of
the protocol. The second experiment is to test the per-
formance of authentication protocols under different
key lengths in the simulation network. The last exper-
iment is to show the performance of key update in the
simulation environment.
One hundred tests of network authentication were
compared with the traditional mutual authentication
protocol which is based on 3GPP AKA protocol [20].
The total delay results are shown in Figure 7. The total
communication and computation time of the EMAKU
protocol is less than the traditional mutual authenti-
cation protocol. Because the communication delay is
too large and there is little difference between them, we
mainly compare the computational delay between the
two protocols (Figure 8).
In the first experiment, the maximum computa-
tion time of the EMAKU protocol is approximately
0.328ms, the minimum time is about 0.053ms, and
the average computation time is about 0.073ms. The
maximum computation time of the traditional authen-
tication scheme is approximately 0.345ms, the min-
imum computation time is about 0.071ms, and the
average computation time is about 0.093ms. The exper-
iment shows that the average efficiency of the EMAKU
protocol is 21.5% higher than that of the traditional
authentication protocol.
In the second experiment, we conduct compari-
son between 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits key symmet-
ric encryption, as shown in Figure 9. The average
encryption time for 128-bits is 378.48ms, the aver-
age time for 192-bits is 380.55ms, the average time
for 256-bits is 380.61ms, and the fluctuation range
is within 10ms. The mutual authentication protocol
is stable in the simulation environment. Because the
mutual authentication protocol in this paper requires
less environment, it has little impact on different key
length.
In a word, the EMAKU protocol works stably in
satellite communication networks.
Figure 7. Total delay comparison of mutual authentication.
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Figure 8. Computation cost comparison of mutual authentication.
Figure 9. Performance test results of different digit number of network authentication key.
Finally, we tests the performance of key update. Since
the router for key update will pass through 1–4 GEO
satellites, the experiments in this paper have done 10
experiments for different paths. The test results are
shown in Figure 10. As is shown in the experiments,
when key update gets though 1 GEO satellite, the max-
imum computation time of the EMAKU protocol is
255.60ms, the minimum time is 269.57ms, the aver-
age time is 262.47ms.When it turns to 2 GEO satellites,
the maximum computation time of the EMAKU pro-
tocol is 392.73 ms, the minimum time is 382.10ms,
the average time is 386.03ms. When it needs to pass
3 GEO satellites, the maximum computation time of
the EMAKU protocol for key update is 519.03ms, the
minimum time is 506.77ms, the average time is 512.32
ms. When it needs to pass 4 GEO satellites, the max-
imum computation time of the EMAKU protocol is
644.21ms, the minimum time is 630.48ms, the average
time is 639.21ms. The total average time is 450.01ms.
The delay of key update protocol varies slightly in
different paths. The large delay between different paths
is due to the fact that every additional satellite passes
through will have an additional time delay between
high orbit satellites.
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Figure 10. Test results of key update.
7. Conclusion
Anewencryption-basedmutual authentication and key
update protocol in satellite communication networks is
proposed in this paper. The security of the EMAKU
protocol is proved by security analysis and the perfor-
mance of the EMAKU protocol is also compared with
the traditional authentication protocols. In the future,
the computing power of satellite is probably more pow-
erful, and the difficulty based on computation power
will eventually be solved. As a result, the use of pub-
lic key cryptography systemon satellite communication
networks will be a potential research direction.
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